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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2002 Brian Bartholomew was charged with possession of 
methamphetamine.1 In hopes of obtaining leniency, Bartholomew chose to 
assist the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force as a confidential informant.2 
As an informant, Bartholomew arranged to buy drugs from Afton Callahan 
at Callahan’s home.3 Bartholomew then contacted narcotics officers to set 
up the sting operation.4 As part of the sting operation, Bartholomew 
entered Callahan’s home with Callahan’s consent and proceeded to buy 
drugs.5 After making the exchange with Callahan, Bartholomew signaled 
narcotics officers, who then entered and arrested Callahan.6 
At first glance the arrest appears to be an everyday, straightforward law 
enforcement tactic, but actually the situation poses a difficult constitutional 
problem: Was the entry by the police officers in Callahan authorized when 
the Fourth Amendment requires police officers to be authorized by 
warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances to enter a home? If Callahan 
gave his consent to Bartholomew, a civilian, can that consent be passed to 
law enforcement? On July 16, 2007, Callahan appealed to the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, alleging that the police officers violated his 
constitutional rights when they entered his home.7 The state conceded there 
was no warrant or exigent circumstances authorizing the officers’ entry 
into Callahan’s home.8 Instead, the state relied on the consent-once-
removed doctrine to establish the officers’ authority to enter and arrest 
Callahan.9  
The consent-once-removed doctrine allows one individual to receive 
consent from the homeowner and then pass that consent to another 
individual, who can then legally enter the home to assist the first 
individual.10 Traditionally, the concept has been applied only to undercover 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 893 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 894. Callahan brought a civil action against the counties and cities involved and the 
individual officers who made the arrest. He alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
when the police raided his home. The district court held that his rights were violated, but the 
officers were afforded qualified immunity. Id. The Tenth Circuit, upon review, affirmed that the 
rights were violated, but reversed the qualified immunity holding, finding that the officers relied on 
rights that were not clearly established. Id. at 898–99. 
 8. Id. at 896. 
 9. Id. 
 10. United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 
Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995)); accord United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 806 
(6th Cir. 2005).  
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officers who received the initial consent,11 but cases like Callahan’s pose 
the question of whether this doctrine is valid when extended to confidential 
informants.12  
In Callahan’s case, the Tenth Circuit considered extending the consent-
once-removed doctrine to include consent obtained by a confidential 
informant. Ultimately, however, the court declined to extend the doctrine 
to civilians and instead held that consent to a confidential informant is 
insufficient under the Fourth Amendment to allow police officers to enter a 
home.13 This decision created a circuit split in the application of the 
doctrine and proves the need for a clear answer to the question of whether 
the consent-once-removed doctrine should be extended to situations 
involving confidential informants.14 
This Note examines the establishment and history of the consent-once-
removed doctrine from its conceptual basis to its current level of 
acceptance. Part II outlines the basic Fourth Amendment concepts that 
underlie the consent-once-removed doctrine. Part III looks more 
specifically at the definition of the doctrine and its gradual formation over 
the past thirty years, as well as its current application to undercover 
officers. Part IV looks more critically at the issues posed by the extension 
of the doctrine to confidential informants, including analysis of the 
inherent differences between a confidential informant and an undercover 
officer, and the subsequent constitutional effects of those differences. 
Finally, Part V concludes that the consent-once-removed doctrine should 
be extended to situations involving confidential informants and that this 
extension is constitutional. 
II.   CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR THE DOCTRINE: COMPETING 
BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES 
The Callahan case illustrates the consent-once-removed doctrine and 
the attenuating issues involved in its extension to confidential informants.15 
Callahan exemplifies the fundamental principles that are in direct conflict: 
the basic privacy right of an individual to be free from unreasonable 
intrusion in his own home and the established concept of waiving, through 
consent, the right to this expected protection.  
                                                                                                                     
 11. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Diaz, 
814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Samet, 794 F. Supp. 178, 181 (E.D. Va. 1992); 
Commonwealth v. Moye, 586 A.2d 406, 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
 12. See Yoon, 398 F.3d at 806; Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856; United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 
645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986); Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 766 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). 
 13. Callahan, 494 F.3d at 898. 
 14. Compare Callahan, 494 F.3d at 898 (rejecting the application of the doctrine to 
confidential informants), with Yoon, 398 F.3d at 808 (treating confidential informants the same as 
undercover officers), and Paul, 808 F.2d at 648 (extending doctrine to confidential informants). 
 15. The Callahan case also presents the issue of the informant’s character, which is typically 
questionable. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
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A.  The Warrant Requirement 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides distinct 
protection for the security of a citizen’s privacy in his home.16 In particular, 
the Amendment provides that the American people have the right “to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures . . . and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable 
cause . . . .”17 The Supreme Court determined in Payton v. New York18 that 
this language prohibits police entry into a person’s home to make a felony 
arrest without a warrant.19 The Court in Katz v. United States reasoned that 
the Constitution requires the impartial decision of a judicial officer to step 
between the citizen and the police.20 The Katz Court stated further that a 
search absent judicial approval is per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment,21 subject to only a few specific exceptions.22 One of these 
exceptions, consent, establishes the initial basis for the consent-once-
removed doctrine and its possible extension.23 Importantly, however, the 
Supreme Court has cautioned that exceptions to the warrant requirement 
are “few in number and carefully delineated.”24 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586–87 (1980) (stating “[i]t is a ‘basic principle 
of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable,” while “objects . . . found in a public place may be seized by the police 
without a warrant”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971) (stating “[i]t is 
accepted, at least as a matter of principle, that a search or seizure carried out on a suspect’s premises 
without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a 
carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of ‘exigent circumstances’”). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 18. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
 19. Id. at 576. 
 20. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 481–82 (1963).  
 21. 389 U.S. at 357; see also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 614–15 (1961) 
(noting that the Fourth Amendment requires a detached magistrate to determine the issuance of a 
search warrant and that attempts by officers to search without a warrant “would reduce the 
Amendment to a nullity”); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960) (stating “[t]he seizure 
can survive constitutional inhibition only upon a showing that the surrounding facts brought it 
within one of the exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a search warrant.”); Jones v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958) (“The exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a 
search warrant have been jealously and carefully drawn . . . .”). 
 22. Various exceptions to the warrant requirement have been recognized, such as consent and 
exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances involve an emergency situation which justifies the 
police’s warrantless entry or search. Exigent circumstances that have appeared more often include: 
1) degree of urgency and amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant, 2) reasonable belief that the 
contraband is about to be removed, 3) possibility of danger to police officers, 4) information 
indicating that the possessors of contraband are aware that the police are on their trail, and 5) the 
ready destructibility of the contraband. United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 265–66 (3d Cir. 
1973); see also Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 390–93 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (providing similar 
list of relevant factors for determining existence of exigent circumstances exception). 
 23. See United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the first entry 
was valid through consent and extending that consent to the second entry); United States v. Paul, 
808 F.2d 645, 647–48 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 24. United States v. United States District Court for the E.D. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 318 
4
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B.  Exception to the Warrant Requirement: Consent Through 
Deception 
The consent exception is routinely thought of as a valuable alternative 
to the warrant requirement.25 Not only does the use of consent avoid the 
complex process of obtaining a warrant, but it can also be used to search 
even when there is no probable cause.26 The basic concept of the consent 
exception is that a person may waive the protection from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Prior to 1973 many courts thought that a valid 
consent could be given only when the consenter knew he had the right to 
refuse consent.27 Then, in 1973, the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte held that the consenter’s ignorance of the right to refuse 
consent was only one factor in the determination of valid consent.28 Thus 
today a “totality of the circumstances” test exists, which focuses on 
whether the consent was voluntary.29 There is no need to ensure that the 
consenter knows of his right to refuse and therefore, law enforcement may 
obtain consent through deception.  
In fact, an effective tool for police in obtaining consent is through a 
misrepresentation of the officer’s identity.30 Commonly this tactic involves 
undercover officers posing as potential narcotics purchasers, similar to the 
factual situation in Callahan v. Millard County.31 The  Supreme Court in 
Hoffa v. United States directly addressed the constitutionality of this issue 
                                                                                                                     
(1972); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 192 (1990) (“The Court has often heard, and 
steadfastly rejected, the invitation to carve out further exceptions to the warrant requirement for 
searches of the home . . . .”); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
 25. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing advantages of 
consent over obtaining a warrant as the burdensome constitutional and statutory requirements which 
attend the issuance and execution of a search warrant, and that in some cases search based on 
consent can allow for a somewhat broader search, and the overall expediency effect of consent on 
the investigation). 
 26. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (stating “one of the specifically 
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is 
conducted pursuant to consent”); see also State v. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d 624, 628 (S.D. 1991). 
 27. Courts were confused as to whether consent to search was a matter of voluntariness or 
whether it involved an actual waiver of the Fourth Amendment rights. LAFAVE, supra note 25, 
§ 8.1, at 8. Compare Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (appearing to focus on 
voluntariness), with United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1966) (applying 
knowing waiver standard to consent searches). 
 28. 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“While the state of the accused’s mind, and the failure of the 
police to advise the accused of his rights, were certainly factors to be evaluated in assessing the 
‘voluntariness’ of an accused’s responses, they were not in and of themselves determinative.”). 
 29. Id. at 226. 
 30. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (stating that the elimination of the 
use of deception by police would “severely hamper the Government in ferreting out those organized 
criminal activities that are characterized by covert dealings with victims who either cannot or do not 
protest. A prime example is provided by the narcotics traffic”). 
 31. Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 893–94 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other 
grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).  
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and firmly stated that at no time has the Court held “that the Fourth 
Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to 
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”32 In 
Lewis v. United States the Court further stated that when the home of an 
individual is “converted into a commercial center . . . for purposes of 
transacting unlawful business,” those transactions should be treated no 
differently than if they occurred in open public.33 This language has been 
cited by at least two courts as evidence of the validity of the consent-once-
removed doctrine.34 Conclusively, in Lewis, the Court made clear that the 
consent provided through deception is valid and that to hold otherwise 
would unreasonably deem any action by an undercover officer as per se 
unconstitutional.35 Thus, Lewis is dispositive on the issue of deception and 
undercover officers.36 
III.   DEFINING THE DOCTRINE 
A.  Development and the Present Status of the Consent-Once-Removed 
Doctrine 
Presently, the consent-once-removed doctrine is recognized in some 
form by four circuit courts and two state supreme courts.37 In addition, 
many other state and federal courts have considered either the base 
concepts of the doctrine or the doctrine itself.38 Generally, these courts 
                                                                                                                     
 32. 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). This concept is an important foundation for the consent-once-
removed doctrine, as it accounts for the completion of the first element of the doctrine. See United 
States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 33. 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966).  
 34.  State v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 132 (N.J. 1993); United States v. Samet, 794 F. Supp. 178, 
182 (E.D. Va. 1992).  
 35. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210. Some opinions, such as the dissent in Henry, have noted that in 
Lewis no evidence was seized as a result of a warrantless entry and thus, the case does not authorize 
seizure of evidence beyond what was originally purchased during the undercover buy. Henry, 627 
A.2d at 134 (O’Hern, J., dissenting). 
 36. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (concluding that Lewisis still good 
law); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Lewisas evidence that 
it is well-settled that undercover officers may lawfully misrepresent their identity). 
 37. Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009); United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648–49 (6th 
Cir. 2000); Bramble, 103 F.3d at 1478; United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 
1995); Henry, 627 A.2d at 130–32; State v. Johnston, 518 N.W.2d 759, 764 (Wis. 1994) (citing 
Diaz and Paul and recognizing the doctrine, but not adopting the term “consent-once-removed”). 
 38. See Samet, 794 F. Supp. at 181. The Samet court, facing a typical undercover narcotics 
purchase by an officer, used the doctrine and opined a straightforward application: 
[The detective] was lawfully in the apartment, and no one disputed that he had the 
authority and probable cause to arrest defendants upon the exchange of the cash 
for the cocaine. The arrest did not become unlawful merely because [the 
detective], as an undercover agent, first signaled the arrest team to assist him. 
6
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approve the doctrine based on the view that, where the first entry is 
obtained through valid consent, the second entry is a mere technicality and 
sufficiently justified.39 Earlier cases that validated entry based on similar 
reasoning as the consent-once-removed doctrine were termed “second 
entry” cases.40 For example, United States v. Janik, decided in 1983, 
approved the “second entry” concept.41 Judge Posner’s opinion in Janik 
exemplifies the early reasoning that preceded the consent-once-removed 
doctrine.42 Judge Posner parsed the issue into a discussion of two separate 
entries.43 First, the initial undercover officer’s entry was lawful because he 
received valid consent.44 Second, the entry of back-up officers was 
dismissed as being “trivial” in its privacy implications because of the 
previously-established consent given to the undercover officer.45  
Similarly, in a natural progression towards the adoption of the doctrine, 
                                                                                                                     
Id.; see also United States v. Schuster, 684 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 1982) (reasoning that consent 
could be passed to agent but not addressing the doctrine); Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 768 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (relying on Schuster, the court allowed consent to be passed from confidential 
informant to agent but did not explicitly mention the doctrine); Commonwealth v. Moye, 586 A.2d 
406, 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (relying on Diaz and United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 
1983), the court formally adopts the consent-once-removed doctrine); Johnston, 518 N.W.2d at 765 
n.6 (declining to adopt doctrine but acknowledging that the doctrine is very similar to its present 
analysis). 
Florida’s case law provides another example of the natural development of the concepts 
underlying the doctrine, though not explicitly adopting consent-once-removed. In Lawrence v. 
State, undercover officers received consent to enter the defendants’ home and then witnessed 
contraband in plain view. 388 So. 2d 1250, 1251–52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). One of the officers then 
left and elicited back-up officers to arrest the defendants. Id. at 1252. The court’s majority found 
that the undercover officer and back-up officers who reentered still had valid consent and thus the 
departed officer’s reentry was constitutional. Id. The concurring opinion by Judge Anstead, later 
adopted in State v. Schwartz, 398 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), gives an even more 
noticeable identification of the doctrine as it stands today. L wrence, 388 So. 2d at 1253 (Anstead, 
J., concurring). “In my view once the defendants admitted the undercover police officers to their 
premises and proceeded to openly engage in criminal conduct in the officers’ presence they could 
not thereafter claim any violation of their reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .” Id
 39. See, e.g., Janik, 723 F.2d at 548 (reasoning that the subsequent entry of other officers 
makes no difference from a constitutional standpoint); Schuster, 684 F.2d at 748–49 (stating that 
the entry of additional agent did not change the fact that the defendant was engaged in illegal 
activity and could not reasonably expect secrecy in his activities); Schwartz, 398 So. 2d at 462 
(finding that the entry of other officers does not bear on the reasonableness or do injustice to the 
Constitution). 
 40. United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987) (terming both White and 
Janik as “second entry” cases).  
 41. 723 F.2d 537, 547–48 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 42. Janik was cited by multiple courts in their establishment of the consent-once-removed 
doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2005); Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 
856; United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 43. Janik, 723 F.2d at 547–48. 
 44. Id. at 547. 
 45. Id. at 548. 
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the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Schuster,46 allowed a transfer of 
consent from an informant to a government agent.47 The Eleventh Circuit 
relied on prior Supreme Court wiretap cases establishing a “misplaced 
trust” theory.48 The wiretap cases allowed an informant to tape record 
private conversations and transmit them to agents.49 In both cases, the 
Court held that the speaker’s privacy interest was no longer protected from 
subsequent broadcast of the conversations.50 The Schuster majority likened 
that situation to the warrantless entry of an individual’s home based upon 
an informant receiving valid consent.51 The court justified the warrantless 
entry by focusing on the depreciated privacy interest and the 
reasonableness of the search or seizure.52 
The first case to term the doctrine and specifically set its parameters 
was United States v. Diaz.53 Diaz’s basic reasoning built on the Seventh 
Circuit’s previous holding in United States v. Paul54 and Janik, which 
emphasized the trivial nature of the privacy interests involved in the 
second entry.55 In Diaz, an undercover officer received valid consent to 
enter a suspect’s hotel room and after establishing probable cause, signaled 
the entry of back-up officers to make the arrest.56 The defendant was 
convicted on multiple counts and appealed the warrantless police entry.57 
In finding law enforcement actions constitutional, the court observed that 
the purpose of a warrant is to prevent unwarranted intrusions, but here the 
intrusion had already taken place by the first officer legally entering with 
                                                                                                                     
 46. 684 F.2d 744 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 47. Id. at 748. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See generally United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect against recording of consensual conversations or rebroadcast of those 
conversations to government agents); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding that the 
monitoring of conversations without a warrant between an informant and the defendant does not 
violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights). 
 50. Schuster, 684 F.2d at 748. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. The court concluded that the search was the same as the one to which was originally 
consented. Thus, there was no privacy implication resulting from a different government agent 
conducting the search. Id. This reasoning is very similar to the reason later developed to justify the 
doctrine. 
 53. United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987). The court applied the doctrine 
only when “the agent (or informant) entered at the express invitation of someone with authority to 
consent, at that point established the existence of probable cause to effectuate an arrest or search, 
and immediately summoned help from other officers.” Id. This is the exact language used in Pollard 
to currently define the doctrine. United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 54. 808 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 55. Diaz, 814 F.2d at 459. The court critically noted the “fact that he was assisted by other 
law enforcement officers in securing his arrest cannot make a constitutional difference.” Id.  
 56. Id. at 456. 
 57. Id. at 456–57. 
8
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consent.58 The Diaz decision began the procession of cases dealing 
explicitly with the consent-once-removed doctrine, as defined by this 
court.59  
The latest and most authoritative decisions on the consent-once-
removed doctrine are within the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.60 The Seventh 
Circuit reaffirmed the doctrine twice after Diaz, including most recently in 
1995 in United States v. Akinsanya.61 In 1993, the Sixth Circuit considered 
the doctrine in United States v. Ogbuh, but decided the case was 
distinguishable from Paul, the Seventh Circuit case.62 The Ogbuh court 
reasoned the doctrine was inapplicable because the informant brought the 
narcotics into the defendant’s home.63 Furthermore, the police forcibly 
entered the home rather than being invited in by the informant as in P ul.64 
Nevertheless, in 2000, in United States v. Pollard, the Sixth Circuit 
formally recognized consent-once-removed, relying on Akinsanya.65 In 
1996, in United States v. Bramble, the Ninth Circuit also approved the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Akinsanya and recognized the validity of the 
consent-once-removed doctrine.66  
B.  Elements and Parameters of the Doctrine 
The elements of the doctrine generally consist of: 1) an undercover 
agent or government informant67 entered at the express invitation of 
someone with authority to consent; 2) at that point established the 
existence of probable cause to effectuate an arrest or search; and 3) 
immediately summoned help from other officers.68 Importantly, there is no 
requirement for an emergency situation to exist before the back-up officers 
enter the premises.69 Thus, the doctrine stands apart from other accepted 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Id. at 459. 
 59. See United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995); State v. Henry, 627 A.2d. 125, 130–31 (N.J. 1993). 
 60. United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 2005); Pollard, 215 F.3d at 648; 
Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856. 
 61. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856; United States v. Jachimko, 19 F.3d 296, 298–99 (7th Cir. 
1994).  
 62. See 982 F.2d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 1993).  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 215 F.3d 643, 648–49 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 66. United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 67. Some courts are unwilling to extend the doctrine to confidential informants. See infra Part 
IV. 
 68. Pollard, 215 F.3d at 648; Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856; Jachimko, 19 F.3d at 299; United 
States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th 
Cir. 1986). 
 69. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856 (applying the doctrine while also acknowledging that no 
exigent circumstances existed); Diaz, 814 F.2d at 459 (noting that no exigent circumstances were 
present, but still applying doctrine). 
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exceptions based on exigent circumstances. Under the first element, it is 
apparent that the initial consent obtained must be valid to support the 
second entry but, as explained above, this consent can be obtained through 
deception or a ruse.70 Despite the validity of consent obtained through 
deception, the consent required by the first element imposes an inherent 
limitation on law enforcement action. The doctrine is predominantly 
applied in situations similar to the Callahan case, where the initial consent 
is for entry specifically to purchase narcotics; consequently, consent is 
limited to entry and not a search of the premises.71 The first officer or 
informant who has consent only to enter one room may not enter other 
rooms that are not impliedly consented to by the defendant in his offer to 
sell narcotics.72 The second element requires the initial agent or informant 
to establish probable cause.73 This is usually done through viewing the 
drugs in plain sight or actually completing the transaction and possessing 
the drugs.74 The imperative of establishing probable cause can be 
contentious, particularly when considering the possible extension of the 
doctrine to confidential informants.75  
The operation of the third element is the crux of the doctrine because it 
marks the point at which uninvited individuals enter the home. It also has 
the potential to implicate serious constitutional issues because the actions 
of the back-up officers can create further privacy compromises. First, in 
order to satisfy the third element, one may question whether the initial 
                                                                                                                     
 70. See supra Part II.B. 
 71. See United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 806 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting the doctrine is 
based on consent to enter the home and not to search). See generally Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 855 
(giving consent to informant to enter for drug transaction); Diaz, 814 F.2d at 456 (admitting 
undercover agent for purchase of narcotics only); Paul, 808 F.2d at 646 (giving consent to 
informant to enter and purchase drugs). 
 72. Even though police officers may receive valid consent from an individual to enter or 
search a home, that entrance or search can still be subject to limits. LAFAVE, supra note 25, 
§ 8.1(c), at 19. Police are constrained by the limit that is expressly given to them by the individual. 
Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 240.3 (1975)). The Court in 
Florida v. Jimeno held that the scope of consent is determined through a standard of objective 
reasonableness, that is, what a reasonable person would believe the limits of the consent were. 500 
U.S. 248, 249 (1991). In the context of consent gained through deception, the scope of consent is 
typically understood through the express purpose for the visit. In consent-once-removed cases, the 
express purpose is to purchase narcotics and thus the officer or informant is limited to areas that are 
reasonably within that purpose. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(“[T]he . . . agents remained in the area where [defendant] had invited them and acted only for the 
purpose for which they had been invited, i.e., to conduct an illegal transaction.”). 
 73. Pollard, 215 F.3d at 648. 
 74. See id. (recognizing that the officer had probable cause to arrest upon seeing the drug 
containers); United States v. Samet, 794 F. Supp. 178, 181 (E.D. Va. 1992) (recognizing that 
probable cause was established through undercover agent receiving the narcotics from defendant); 
State v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 128 (N.J. 1993) (establishing probable cause through completion of 
drug transaction). 
 75. See infra Part IV. 
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officer or informant must stay on the premises during the arrest. It is 
generally considered much safer to allow the undercover officer or 
informant to leave the premises before arresting the defendant.76 Therefore, 
many undercover operations involve the agent or informant establishing 
probable cause and then leaving under the guise of retrieving money.77 I  
these situations the apparent rule is that the momentary exit of the agent or 
informant does not render the doctrine inapplicable.78 However, the rule 
can be contingent upon the agent or informant maintaining an express or 
implied right to reenter. If the informant or agent leaves the residence with 
no implied right to reenter the doctrine can be inapposite depending on the 
time in between and the location of the subsequent arrest.79  
                                                                                                                     
 76. Edward M. Hendrie, Consent Once Removed, THE FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Feb. 
2003, at 24, 26; see also Henry, 627 A.2d at 130 (reasoning that removal of undercover agent was 
justified on safety grounds because “weapons are usually found where illegal drugs are sold”). 
 77. See United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 854–55 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 457 (7th Cir. 1987); Fidalgo v. State, 659 So. 2d 290, 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); 
Lawrence v. State, 388 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 765 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). 
 78. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856 (holding that momentary exit does not matter because the 
initial consent acted as a substitute for a warrant); Diaz, 814 F.2d at 459 (stating “the fact that 
[undercover agent] momentarily stepped out to obtain help from other officers in making the arrest 
did not vitiate this consent”); United States v. Santiago, Nos. 92 CR 881-1, 881-2, 1993 WL 75140, 
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1993) (allowing the application of the doctrine despite the exit of the 
confidential informant); Commonwealth v. Moye, 586 A.2d 406, 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) 
(holding “an officer’s momentary exit to secure back up does not invalidate an otherwise legal 
arrest”). But see United States v. Herrera-Corral, No. 01 CR 141, 2002 WL 69491, at *1, 7, 9 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 17, 2002). In Herrera, a confidential informant entered the defendant’s apartment with 
consent and observed narcotics. Id. at *1. Thereafter, the informant left the apartment under the 
premise of collecting money and confirmed to waiting law enforcement agents the existence of the 
narcotics. Id. The informant then definitively left the scene and approximately two minutes later, 
law enforcement forcibly entered the defendant’s apartment and arrested the defendant. Id. The 
court held that the third requirement of the consent-once-removed doctrine—“immediately 
summoned help from other officers”—was not met for two reasons. Id. at *7. First, the court treated 
the absence of the confidential informant during the arrest as nearly dispositive. Id. The court 
reasoned that the primary justification for the doctrine is to facilitate protection of the undercover 
officer or informant and thus, the absence of the informant obviates the primary purpose of the 
doctrine. Id. Second, the court restrictively defined “immediately” as only encompassing instances 
illustrated in Diaz and Akinsanya, that is where “the [confidential informant] or agent exited the 
premises momentarily, or at the same time that agents entered the apartment.” Id. at *9. 
 79. See Smith v. State, 857 A.2d 1224, 1231–32 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). In Smith, the 
undercover agent was invited into the home of the defendant to purchase narcotics, and the agent 
completed the transaction and then left to inform the back-up team of the completion. Id. The court 
distinguished the instant case from that of Baith v. State, in which the concept of consent-once-
removed was applied, though not explicitly adopted, in two respects. Id. at 1231. First, the 
transaction was completed and the undercover agent had no expected and implicit right to return. 
Id. Second, when the arrest team arrested the defendant he was already outside his home and on a 
public street, this gave them no right to enter the premises and obtain the narcotics. Id. The court 
further noted that the doctrine is not applicable in these situations because the specific language of 
the third element requires that the back-up officers assist in the arrest. Id. at 1232. Thus, if the 
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Second, even if the officer may leave momentarily, the length of time 
between the transaction and the arrest can potentially invalidate the back-
up officers’ authority to enter. Relatively few decisions have dealt 
specifically with a prolonged time period between the transaction and the 
arrest. In State v. Henry, the Supreme Court of New Jersey determined that 
fifteen to twenty minutes was not long enough to vitiate the consent 
obtained by the undercover officer.80 The court reasoned that the delay 
between the two entries was relatively brief and, thus, the circumstances 
that originally established the probable cause had likely not dissipated.81 
Similarly, the court in United States v. Santiago held that a fifteen minute 
respite was sufficiently “immediate” under the doctrine.82 However, in 
United States v. Herrera-Corral, the same court redefined “immediate” 
and held that a mere two minute delay was insufficient to apply the 
doctrine.83 The court specifically relied on the holdings of Diaz and 
Akinsanya to determine that the “immediate” requirement is only satisfied 
when “the [confidential informant] or agent exited the premises 
momentarily, or at the same time that agents entered the apartment.”84 
Additionally, a more recent New Jersey case limited the doctrine and held 
that thirty to forty-five minutes is too long to maintain valid authority to 
enter.85 In State v. Penalber,86 after the narcotics sale was complete the 
agent left and went back to the stationhouse to discuss the arrest of the 
suspect with the back-up officers who had been present at the initial 
transaction.87 The court focused on the language in Henry that the separate 
entries must be “‘of a single, continuous, and integrated police action and 
were not interrupted or separated by an unduly prolonged delay.’”88 
Because thirty to forty-five minutes had passed and the officers left the 
scene of the transaction, the court reasoned that the continuity requirement 
                                                                                                                     
defendant was already arrested outside, there is no justification of the warrantless entry of back-up 
officers in the home. Id.; see also People v. Finley, 687 N.E.2d 1154, 1160–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
The court in Finley declined to apply the doctrine to the instant situation because, among other 
things, the informant left the house and gave the signal to arrest with no apparent right to reenter. 
Finley, 687 N.E.2d at 1160–61. The court distinguished its case by pointing at the Seventh Circuit 
cases that did apply the doctrine, stating “[i]mportantly, the defendant understood that the informant 
would leave to obtain the money from his ‘buyer’ and would return to the defendant’s premises.” 
Id. at 1160. 
 80. 627 A.2d 125, 129–30 (N.J. 1993). 
 81. Id. The court also relied on the safety intentions of the police to remove the undercover 
agent and prevent undue risk in the arrest as well as on the language in Diaz that allowed the agent 
to momentarily step out to request back-up. Id. 
 82. Nos. 92 CR 881-1, 881-2, 1993 WL 75140, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1993). 
 83. No. 01 CR 141, 2002 WL 69491, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2002). 
 84. Id.  
 85. State v. Penalber, 898 A.2d 538, 542 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 541. 
 88. Id. at 542 (quoting State v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 131 (N.J. 1993)). 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss2/5
2010] THE CONSENT-ONCE-REMOVED OCTRINE 505 
 
established in Henry was not achieved and consent-once-removed was 
unjustified.89  
C.  Justification for the Doctrine as to Undercover Officers 
The consent-once-removed doctrine as it applies to undercover officers 
has survived enough judicial scrutiny for its justifications to be considered 
valid. Using the basic concepts outlined in Part II, this Part illustrates the 
various justifications that have led to the establishment of the doctrine. It is 
helpful to first introduce these concepts in the context of an undercover 
officer and then compare them to the possibility of extending the doctrine 
to confidential informants.  
1.  Who Needs Privacy When You Have Drugs? 
One justification for applying the doctrine to undercover officers is that 
the individual's privacy interest is eliminated and no longer reasonable 
once the individual brandishes his contraband to the police.90 The court in 
Henry discussed the privacy interests involved in the drug transaction 
between the defendant and an undercover officer.91 Relying on United 
States v. Lewis, the court stated that “[b]ecause [the] defendant had plainly 
opened her home to commercial drug traffic . . . her complaint now that 
some of her supposed customers invaded the sanctity of her home appears 
flimsy.”92 This disregard for the privacy complaints of the guilty underlies 
most decisions that have applied the consent-once-removed doctrine or its 
concept.93 The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States stated that “[w]hat a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is 
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”94 Thus, if the drug 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Id.  
 90. United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 649 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Paul, 808 
F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986); State v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 132 (N.J. 1993). 
 91. Henry, 627 A.2d at 131–32. The Henry case involved an undercover officer approaching 
an apartment and knocking on the door. Id. at 126. Upon the defendant answering the door, the 
undercover officer stated, “let me get two,” while at the same time entering the apartment. Id. The 
undercover officer was then directed to another individual from whom he proceeded to purchase 
drugs. Id. After exiting the apartment the undercover officer radioed back-up officers, who arrived 
and helped to effectuate the arrest. Id. at 126–27. 
 92. Id. at 132. 
 93. See Pollard, 215 F.3d at 649 (“Moreover, the back-up officers were acting within 
constitutional limits . . . since no further invasion of privacy was involved once the undercover 
officer made the initial entry.”); Paul, 808 F.2d at 648 (noting that “the interest in the privacy of the 
home . . . has been fatally compromised” once the owner admits the informant or officer); State v. 
Schwartz, 398 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (applying a similar concept as consent-once-
removed and holding that once defendant engaged in criminal activity with the undercover officer 
the defendant could not thereafter claim any violation of expectancy of privacy); Baith v. State, 598 
A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (speaking about the defendant’s home, the court stated, 
“its status as anctum sanctorum is rudely diminished”). 
 94. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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transaction is characterized as opening or exposing commercial activities 
to random strangers, there are no legitimate privacy interests to protect. 
Furthermore, if the consent-once-removed doctrine is executed properly 
and the back-up officers merely assist in making an arrest,95 there is no 
illegal extension of the consent and no additional harm to defendants’ 
privacy interests.  
2.  Power to Arrest and the Need for Safe Assistance 
Courts often rely on the power to arrest and the need for safe assistance 
in executing arrests when affirming the doctrine.96 Similar to many other 
courts, the court in United States v. Yoon relied on this justification and 
even stated that it is the basis upon which the doctrine rests.97 In most 
                                                                                                                     
 95. See supra Part III.B. 
 96.  See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[P]rivacy was 
outweighed by the legitimate concern for the safety of [the officers inside].”); United States v. Diaz, 
814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he fact that [the agent] was assisted by other law 
enforcement officers in securing his arrest cannot make a constitutional difference.”); United States 
v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 548 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[I]f [the officer] was privileged to slip the gun 
underneath his jacket and leave the apartment we think he was also privileged to have a police 
escort to prevent interference by [the defendant].”); id. (holding, in a situation not applying the 
doctrine in name, that “[t]he fact that [the officer] got help from other officers in removing the 
submachine gun can make no difference”); United States v. White, 660 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 
1981) (holding, while not applying the doctrine in name, that consent was part of an ongoing 
investigation and entry was permissible even where consent was obtained through deceit); Fidalgo 
v. State, 659 So. 2d 290, 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (stating that since the defendant would have no 
constitutional complaint if he was arrested by the undercover officer, it makes no constitutional 
difference if the arrest was done by other officers); United States v. Herrera-Corral, No. 01 CR 141, 
2002 WL 69491, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2002) (“An important justification for consent once 
removed is the aid and protection of the undercover agent or [confidential informant] still a  the 
defendant’s home.”); Commonwealth v. Moye, 586 A.2d 406, 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“[I]n this 
instance I’m satisfied that the officer, herself, of course had the right to make the arrest had she 
chosen to herself. But the arrest having been made only seconds later by her brother officer or 
officers in this Court’s judgment does not alter the facts as viewed here.”); United States v. Samet, 
794 F. Supp. 178, 181 (E.D. Va. 1992) (“The arrest did not become unlawful merely because [the 
detective], as an undercover agent, first signalled [sic] the arrest team to assist him.”); State v. 
Johnston, 518 N.W.2d 759, 764 (Wis. 1994) (“Thus, in terms of Fourth Amendment protections, 
the uniformed officers did nothing more than assist the undercover officers who were themselves 
lawfully on the premises and who were, as conceded by [the defendant], fully within the law to 
arrest the suspects and seize the incriminating evidence they had discovered.”). 
 97. 398 F.3d 802, 809 (6th Cir. 2005). The court reasoned: 
The doctrine, therefore, is not based upon either the exigent circumstances or the 
traditional consent exception to the warrant requirement. Rather, it is based upon 
the theory that, because an undercover agent or informant who establishes 
probable cause to arrest the suspect may in fact arrest him then and there, he 
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consent-once-removed cases, the undercover officer gains valid entry 
through consent and then verifies probable cause by observing illegal items 
in plain view.98 At this point, the undercover officer has the authority to 
arrest.99 Accordingly, because the undercover officer has the authority to 
arrest upon establishing probable cause, the undercover officer should not 
be precluded from calling for back-up to assist in safely making the arrest. 
This justification rests on concern for the safety of the undercover officer 
engaged in the narcotics transaction.100 Not only is it safer for the officer to 
receive back-up before making the arrest, but in many circumstances the 
safest route is for the undercover officer to remain in his undercover 
capacity and allow only back-up officers to make the arrest.101 The 
Callahan court most aptly summarized the rationale for the power-to-arrest 
argument: there is no constitutional distinction between one officer who 
may legally arrest and many officers who may legally arrest.102 
3.  Reasonableness of Requiring a Warrant 
If the elimination of a privacy interest has truly occurred and the arrest 
can legally be made, one may question why a warrant is required at that 
point. In applying the doctrine some courts have answered simply that the 
police actions are reasonable.103 The Seventh Circuit in United States v. 
White noted that the purpose of requiring a warrant is to place the 
                                                                                                                     
 98. See Pollard, 215 F.3d at 648 (“[T]he undercover officer[] entered the apartment at the 
invitation of [the defendant] and established the existence of probable cause to arrest when he 
saw [another man] pull out the three drug containers.”); United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 
852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[Defendant] consented to [the officer’s] entry into the apartment; [the 
officer] saw the heroin (thus establishing probable cause).”); Paul, 808 F.2d at 648 
(“[Defendant] invited [the informant] into his house and down to the basement, where the 
marijuana was in plain view.”). 
 99. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 413–17 (1976) (discussing that the necessary 
standard for a warrantless arrest is probable cause); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111–14 (1975) 
(noting that when probable cause is established, the officer may arrest). 
 100. See Hendrie, supra note 76, at 26 (describing the danger of the typical undercover 
narcotics purchase). 
 101. Id. It is also more efficient for future police work to let the undercover officer keep his 
status as a drug purchaser or dealer, thus enabling him to go on further drug purchases in the area. 
The officer has the authority to make the arrest, but under the circumstances the most efficient and 
safest method may be to allow others to arrest. Id. 
 102. Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). Despite the fact that the court was dealing with a 
confidential informant situation, it opined that “the consent granted to the hypothetical undercover 
officer would have covered additional backup officers without any need for additional exceptions to 
the warrant requirement.” Id. 
 103. Although some decisions that apply the doctrine or its concept do not focus on overall 
reasonableness, it remains a justification that some believe clearly supports upholding the action of 
the police. See State v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 131 (N.J. 1993) (“Under all the surrounding 
circumstances, the subsequent entry into defendant’s apartment by the police to effectuate an arrest 
was reasonable . . . .”). 
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independent consideration of a neutral and detached magistrate between 
police and citizen, thereby preventing unwarranted intrusions.104 However, 
in the common consent-once-removed situation, the primary intrusion of 
privacy has already legally occurred by the undercover officer.105 Thus, 
“[i]t serves no purpose to require an arrest warrant where the same 
intrusion would occur whether or not the magistrate issued the warrant.”106 
This argument focuses on the initial intrusion of privacy by the undercover 
officer and puts aside the possible further intrusion of the second entry.107 
But, as stated previously, the doctrine has been carefully articulated to only 
apply in situations where the back-up officers merely assist in the arrest,108 
and the requirement of a warrant would be redundant.  
Under this theory, it might be possible to characterize the overall 
conceptual basis of the doctrine as a “quasi exigent circumstances and 
consent” justification.109 Although this characterization is not used by most 
courts, it is helpful in providing further analysis of the reasonableness of 
police actions.110 To recognize a new exigency and to legitimate a 
warrantless entry, the government interest and the citizen’s privacy interest 
must be balanced.111  
The consent-once-removed doctrine routinely is used in situations 
involving narcotics and weapons, and in many cases there could be a very 
large amount of narcotics.112 The government has a great interest in 
removing these dangerous and illicit items from the possibility of 
distribution or use as soon as possible. Furthermore, there is an interest in 
efficiency, as in all consent-once-removed situations the government can 
immediately make an arrest.113 When these government interests are 
                                                                                                                     
 104. 660 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.; see also United States v. Santiago, Nos. 92 CR 881-1, 881-2, 1993 WL 75140, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1993). 
 107. The case of United States v. White was decided before the articulation of the doctrine, but 
still dealt with circumstances similar to most other cases decided under the doctrine. The court 
focused ultimately on the intrusion of the undercover officer and dismissed the second entry by 
back-up officers as a non-issue because the undercover officer remained in the apartment at all 
times. White, 660 F.2d at 1183 n.3. 
 108. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 109. United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 809 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 110. Only the court in Yoon has made this characterization, while no other courts appear to 
explicitly recognize exigent circumstances at all in most consent-once-removed cases. Id. at 809 
n.2. 
 111. United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 649 (6th Cir. 2000) (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing 
United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1519 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
 112. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 113. However, note the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that police expediency alone is 
no justification for warrantless searches. SeeCallahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 897 (10th 
Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (citing Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 n.5 (2006)); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971). 
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compared to the all-but-vanished privacy interest of the individual, the 
government interests appear clearly dominant. In other words, the interplay 
of the privacy interest and the government interest results in a 
determination that the actions by the police are reasonable. The initial 
privacy interest is diminished through the valid consent and the remaining 
interest is outweighed by the legitimate government interest of safety.114  
IV.   EXTENSION OF THE DOCTRINE TO CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANTS 
If the previous discussion referring to undercover officers did not 
provide much controversy, the extension of the doctrine to confidential 
informants will unquestionably incite debate. Few courts have been 
challenged with determining the constitutionality of applying the doctrine 
to confidential informants.115 But, when presented with the issue, a 
vigorous debate has ensued over its viability. These debates depend much 
on what each individual court views as the conceptual basis for the 
doctrine. When extending the doctrine, courts ultimately conclude that 
there is no recognizable difference between an informant and an officer.116 
While when rejecting the doctrine’s extension, opponents argue that 
extension does not afford the requisite protection to the homeowner 
intended by the Supreme Court in Payton v. New York.117 Dissenting 
opinions point specifically to drastic differences between an undercover 
officer and a civilian informant.118 This Part thoroughly analyzes the main 
arguments for and against extension and illustrates why extension is 
ultimately constitutional. This constitutionality is based upon a confluence 
of factors: the diminished privacy interest of the defendant, the informant’s 
power to arrest, and the informant’s adoption into the investigation. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 114. The court in Bramble cited the government interest as concern for the safety of the 
undercover officer. The court stated that this interest outweighed any remaining expectation of 
privacy by the defendant. United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 115. For more on the status of the doctrine and the outcomes of those decisions, see nfra Part 
IV.A. 
 116. See United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 811 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is no justifiable 
distinction between the undercover officer’s and an informant’s ability to call upon the police to aid 
in the arrest.”); United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986) (“It makes no difference 
that the owner does not know he is dealing with an informant.”). 
117. See United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 650 (6th Cir. 2000) (Jones, J., dissenting) 
(finding that the government has not shown that “any legitimate government interests purportedly 
vindicated by the ‘consent once remove [sic] doctrine’ override [the defendant’s] privacy 
expectations”). 
 118. Dissenting opinions also point out that the search of the home and exceptions to it are not 
taken lightly. The dissenting judge in Yoon stated, “[T]he [Supreme Court] has often heard, and 
steadfastly rejected, the invitation to carve out further exceptions to the warrant requirement for 
searches of the home.” Yoon, 398 F.3d at 811 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (quoting Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 192 (1990)). 
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A.  Present Status of Extension to Confidential Informants 
As defined in United States v. Diaz,119 the consent-once-removed 
doctrine has been expressly extended to confidential informants in both the 
Sixth120 and the Seventh121 Circuits and rejected in the Tenth122 Circuit. 
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Schuster,123 although prior to the 
terming of the doctrine, also held that consent can be passed from an 
informant to a government officer.124 Additionally, the question has been 
addressed in lower courts across the country.125 For example, Illinois’s 
Second District Court of Appeals applied the doctrine to confidential 
informants in People v. Galdine.126 While other cases such as Baith v. 
State127 and State v. Fernandez128 have extended the concept, though not 
                                                                                                                     
 119. United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 120. Yoon, 398 F.3d at 811. See generally Pollard, 215 F.3d at 649 (majority opinion). The 
defendant in Pollard was arrested after selling cocaine to both a confidential informant and an 
undercover officer in the same transaction. Pollard, 215 F.3d at 645. The court’s analysis focused 
on the undercover officer’s actions and his ability to arrest and summon back-up; therefore the 
extension was not recognized by this case. Id. at 648–49. However, Pollard clearly paves the way 
for the acceptance of the extension as it includes “informant” in the definition of the doctrine. Id. at 
648. 
121. Paul, 808 F.2d at 648. 
122. Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
123. 684 F.2d 744 (11th Cir. 1982).  
124. Id. at 748–49. The informant and the agent entered the premises together and then the 
informant directed the agent exactly which room to enter to retrieve the illicit item. Id. at 748. This 
situation is similar to that of Pollard, involving both an informant and an agent. See Pollard, 215 
F.3d at 645. However, the court in Schuster appears to hurdle some of the discussion of the 
constitutional differences between an informant and an agent by recognizing the informant as an 
agent of the government, rather than focusing on the informant’s civilian status. Sch ter, 684 F.2d 
at 748–49. The court stated, “[t]he facts of this case, however, do require us to extend the consent 
given to one agent to yet another full-time Secret Service agent.” Id. at 748. 
125. See also United States v. Herrera-Corral, No. 01 CR 141, 2002 WL 69491 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
17, 2002); U.S. ex rel. McCalla v. Gramley, No. 96 C 0418, 1996 WL 699629 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 
1996); United States v. Jachimko, 905 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ill. 1995); United States v. Jones, Nos. 
95 C 2907, 92 CR 427, 1995 WL 443929 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 1995); United States v. Santiago, Nos. 
92 CR 881-1, 881-2, 1993 WL 75140 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1993); People v. Finley, 687 N.E.2d 1154 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
 126. People v. Galdine, 571 N.E.2d 182, 190–91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). The informant arranged 
a narcotics sale with the defendant to take place in the defendant’s office parking lot. Id. at 185. The 
transaction did not go as planned and the sale was made in the defendant’s office building. Id. After 
observing the narcotics, the informant signaled the back-up officers and they entered and made the 
arrest. Id. The court validated the actions by the police by relying on United States v. Paul. Id. at 
190–91. 
 127. Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 766 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). 
 128. State v. Fernandez, 538 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). In Fernandez the 
confidential informant was invited into the home to conduct a narcotics transaction. Id. at 899. Once 
the informant observed and tested the cocaine he left under the auspice of obtaining money for the 
buy. Id. He returned with members of the Metro-Dade Police Department. Id. a  899–900. Although 
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explicitly addressing the doctrine.  
B.  Examining the Differences Between an Undercover Officer 
and a Confidential Informant 
The consent-once-removed doctrine suggests by its name that the 
second entry is justified on a passing of valid consent from one individual 
to another. But as previously discussed, this suggestion is misleading:129 
most courts justify use of the doctrine in other ways.130 In the case of 
undercover officers, courts generally reason that the second entry is the 
same as the valid first entry, treating the two as effectively one entry.131 
However, it is much more difficult to make this argument for a confidential 
informant. One may question whether a confidential informant and an 
officer can be considered as one entity, thus treating the two entries as one. 
Further, there exists inherent differences between them, namely the fact 
that one is an officer of the law and the other is a civilian. Arguments 
against extension of the doctrine naturally focus on the effect of these 
differences on the previously discussed justifications for undercover 
officers.  
1.  Privacy Interest Remains Compromised 
If offering the sale of narcotics to an undercover officer is considered a 
destruction of the privacy interest,132 how is an offer of sale to a 
confidential informant any different? The logic that applies in the 
undercover officer situation equally applies here. As stated previously, the 
non-recognition of a legitimate privacy interest in a narcotics sale situation 
is largely based on language in United States v. Lewis and its progeny.133 
As the Court in Lewis observed, “[the defendant] invited the undercover 
agent to his home for the specific purpose of executing a felonious sale of 
narcotics. [The defendant’s] only concern was whether the agent was a 
                                                                                                                     
never adopting the doctrine itself, the court ruled that a confidential informant could pass consent to 
the officers. Id. at 900. 
 129. At least one court has chosen not to adopt the term “consent-once-removed” because the 
term was perceived as “confusing and unnecessary” and generally unhelpful in making a thorough 
analysis. State v. Johnston, 518 N.W.2d 759, 765 n.6 (Wis. 1994). 
 130. See supra Part III.C. But see Hendrie, supra note 76, at 28 ( “[T]he consent once removed 
doctrine is not based upon an emergency concern for the safety of the undercover officer or 
informant; rather, it is founded on the premise that the initial consent given by the suspect to an 
undercover officer or informant can be transferred to the arrest team, justifying their second 
entry.”). 
 131. See State v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 131 (N.J. 1993) (“[T]he separate entries can be viewed 
as components of a single, continuous, and integrated police action . . . .”); State v. Penalber, 898 
A.2d 538, 540 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (holding officers may reenter the premises “if the 
separate entries can be viewed as components of a single, continuous and integrated police action”). 
 132. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 133. See supra Part III.C.1. 
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willing purchaser who could pay the agreed price.”134 This language does 
not center on the identity of the supposed customer, but rather focuses on 
the defendant’s actions and the reasonable expectations the defendant 
would have in those types of endeavors.135 An individual does not 
distinguish between an undercover officer and an informant when an 
individual agrees to sell narcotics out of his home. Simply put, the 
defendant’s privacy interest is vitiated by his actions and not the identity of 
the invitee.  
Assuming that consent to the civilian informant vitiates the defendant’s 
privacy interest for the reasons stated above, the more important question 
is: how far does that destruction of privacy extend? The next step in the 
doctrine, summoning the back-up officers to make the arrest, can 
potentially implicate privacy through the exchange of information from the 
confidential informant to the police and the subsequent entry by the police. 
However, the Supreme Court has frequently held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect information provided to a third party under 
the assumption that the information will remain private.136 The third party 
is free to communicate knowledge to government authorities without 
thereby violating any constitutionally protected interests.137 But the 
defendant also has the ability to limit the consent he gives.138 The dissent 
in Schuster argues that in the informant context the defendant only 
consents to the entry of one person (the informant).139 Thus, there is an 
                                                                                                                     
 134. United States v. Lewis, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966). 
 135. After noting that the defendant has converted his home into a commercial center for 
illegal business and thus it is afforded no more protection than if it was done in public, the Court 
further stated, “[a] government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an 
invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by 
the occupant.” Id. at 211. 
 136. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (finding “[n]either this Court nor 
any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s 
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it”); 
see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (“Inescapably, one contemplating illegal 
activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police.”). 
 137. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The defendant attempted to 
suppress his bank records when they were obtained by the police through a subpoena. Id. at 439–40. 
The defendant argued that the Fourth Amendment protected the access to his financial records that 
the bank possessed. I The Court found the actions by the government were legal and stated:  
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that 
it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third 
party will not be betrayed. 
Id. at 443. 
 138. See supra note 72. 
 139.  Schuster, 684 F.2d 744, 749–50 (11th Cir. 1982) (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
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implicit limitation,140 and the additional entry of the police is beyond the 
defendant’s privacy expectations.141 This is attractive reasoning, but as the 
dissent in Callahan notes, it is a fiction to expect that in an undercover 
officer situation, consent is ever really given to the police.142 In undercover 
officer situations, the defendant always consents to an individual whose 
true identity is unknown. The most intuitive conclusion is that the 
defendant vitiates his privacy interests when he illegally sells narcotics, 
whether he sells to an undercover officer or a confidential informant. Yet 
the defendant's diminished privacy interest alone does not authorize the 
entry of back-up officers; it merely raises the likelihood of reasonableness 
of the warrantless entry.143 The legality of the entry of back-up officers in 
the undercover officer context also relies on the need to assist the 
undercover officer and on the back-up officer's restricted role.144 Thus, 
there still remains the need for another justification to supplement the 
decreased privacy and authorize the entry of back-up officers in the 
confidential informant situation.  
2.  Confidential Informants’ Power to Arrest and Need for Safe 
Assistance 
A core feature of the doctrine, as applied to undercover officers, is that 
the officer has the ability to arrest the individual at the moment probable 
cause is established.145 The back-up officers merely provide safe assistance 
and help effectuate that arrest.146 Similarly, most states authorize their 
citizens to make arrests when a felony has been committed in their 
presence or when one has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been 
                                                                                                                     
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 749 (“The narrowness of [the defendant’s] consent delimits the extent of the 
legitimate expectation of privacy that he agreed to give up . . . .”). 
 142. See Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 902 (10th Cir. 2007) (Kelly, J., 
dissenting), rev’d on other grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). Judge Kelly 
explained: 
While it is technically correct that [the defendant] never consented to the entry of 
police, no one ever consents to the entry of police in these undercover situations; 
they instead consent to the entry of someone who might be the police . . . or as in 
this case, someone who might be a government agent . . . . 
Id. 
 143. The dissent in Callahan disagrees and would simply allow entry of law enforcement 
based upon the eroded privacy interest of the defendant without consideration of any other factors. 
Id. at 901. 
 144. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 145. See supra Part III.C.2; see also United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 146. See Pollard, 215 F.3d at 649; United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987); 
United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 548 
(7th Cir. 1983). 
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committed.147 Therefore, in both the confidential informant and undercover 
officer situation, the entrance of back-up officers may be justified by the 
need for safe assistance in effectuating the arrest.148 As the concurring 
opinion in Yoon concluded, after acknowledging that arrest power lies with 
citizens, “there is no justifiable distinction between the undercover 
officer’s and an informant’s ability to call upon the police to aid in the 
arrest.”149 
Yet despite its importance, the power to arrest is neither necessary nor 
dispositive for extension of the doctrine to confidential informants.150 The 
third element of the doctrine asserts that the back-up officer’s scope of 
responsibility is to assist the first agent or informant.151 A reasonable 
interpretation of this element might conclude that for the back-up officers 
to be limited in responsibility and merely assist, the informant must be able 
to effectuate the arrest himself. Furthermore, many courts that affirm the 
application of the doctrine to informants cite the informant’s arrest 
power.152 The Sixth,153 Seventh,154 and Tenth Circuits,155 in their 
discussions of a possible extension of the doctrine, have considered the 
citizen’s power to arrest.156 However, in all three circuits the arrest power, 
although contentious, was not dispositive in determining extension of the 
doctrine.157 
                                                                                                                     
 147. Under the traditional common law, the private citizen was granted the power to arrest for 
felonies committed in his presence and felonies based on probable cause, provided that the crime 
actually occurred. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 47 (2008). In states where common law is in force, the 
citizen’s power to arrest still remains, but some states have modified this power through statute. Id.; 
see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 837 (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.16 (West 2008); 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.30 (McKinney 2008). 
 148. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 149. Yoon, 398 F.3d at 811 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
 150. At least one concurring opinion has suggested that the power to arrest is “potentially 
necessary” to support the doctrine. See id. at 810 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 151. The doctrine as defined in Diaz reads: the undercover agent or government informant 
“entered at the express invitation of someone with authority to consent, at that point established the 
existence of probable cause to effectuate an arrest or search, and imme iately summoned help from 
other officers.” Diaz, 814 F.2d at 459 (emphasis added); see supra Part III.B. 
 152. See Paul, 808 F.2d at 648 (“If [the informant] had been a police undercover agent rather 
than a confidential informant, he could have arrested [the defendant] then and there . . . .”); 
Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, Pearson v. 
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (discussing the power to arrest in the possible extension of the 
doctrine to confidential informants); Pollard, 215 F.3d at 648 (“[The officer] could have arrested 
both [defendants] had he chosen to do so.”). 
 153. Yoon, 398 F.3d at 807. 
 154. Paul, 808 F.2d at 648. 
 155. Callahan, 494 F.3d at 897. 
 156. Other courts that allow a confidential informant to pass consent to the police have not 
addressed the arrest power of citizens, but most of these were decided before the specific elements 
of the doctrine were articulated. See Schuster, 684 F.2d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 157. See Callahan, 494 F.3d at 897; Yoon, 398 F.3d. at 807; Paul, 808 F.2d at 648. 
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 To determine the necessity of the power to arrest one must consider the 
language of the third element in the context of privacy implications as well 
as overall reasonableness, which is the primary concern in the warrantless 
entry of a home.158 The utility of the third element of the doctrine is its 
restricting component. This component is designed to ensure the 
maintenance of a limited scope of entry and thereby reduce additional 
privacy implications. The back-up officers are not restricted to doing only 
what the first agent or informant could do (arrest) but rather to entering 
only where the first agent or informant could enter. Under this reasoning, 
the officers do not harm the defendant’s privacy interest because they were 
going only where the undercover officer or informant was already 
permitted to go. Accordingly, the informant’s ability to arrest is not 
necessary in order for the back-up officers to assist him.  
3.  The Informant as an Agent of the Police 
What is necessary for the constitutionality of extension is the general 
adoption of the informant into the police investigation and his use as an 
agent of their actions. Confidential informants working as government 
agents may potentially face civil liability for their actions in that 
capacity.159 This fact, along with the power to arrest, is important because 
it makes the confidential informant more like the undercover officer in his 
responsibilities,160 and as stated above, the consent-once-removed 
doctrine’s constitutionality is partially rooted in the existence of one 
contiguous police action.161 On the other hand, the police have further 
responsibilities and powers not recognized in informants which can make 
their appearance less like that of an officer.162 Powers such as the ability to 
seize evidence in plain view and the theory of collective knowledge can be 
considered duties and privileges that have been narrowly granted to police 
only.163 Even so, these privileges are inconsequential to the confidential 
informant’s restricted action in a consent-once-removed situation.  
Ultimately, an informant appears all but identical to an officer from the 
defendant’s perspective.164 In many undercover narcotics purchases the 
                                                                                                                     
 158. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 
(1983); United States v. Schuster, 717 F.2d 537, 538 (11th Cir. 1983) (Tjoflat, J., concurring). 
 159. Callahan, 494 F.3d at 902 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 
798–99 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
 160. See id. 
 161. See supra note 138. 
 162. Callahan, 494 F.3d at 897 (majority opinion) (noting that police have other powers and 
responsibilities such as the duty to execute warrants). 
 163. United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 813 (6th Cir. 2005) (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
 164. It is important to note the general action expected of an informant in a consent-once-
removed situation is to purchase narcotics and, upon purchasing the narcotics, summon the 
assistance of law enforcement. This action does not necessitate any particular skills or 
responsibilities besides arguably the ability to recognize the illicit drugs in establishing probable 
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undercover officer or informant typically remains in his undercover 
capacity throughout, thereby further limiting his role and reducing any 
dissimilarities.165 As the court in Baith v. State recognized, “[t]he status of 
the observer of the crime as a cooperating civilian, on the one hand, or an 
official police officer, on the other hand, has no bearing on the observer’s 
legal competence to trigger the arrest scenario.”166 The use of an informant 
as an agent of police action and his limited decision-making in the 
investigation create the most logical argument for extension. The 
informant’s limited agency role also refutes the argument some have posed 
about the initial consent never really being given to law enforcement.167 
The informant is not simply a civilian but rather an agent working under 
the close supervision of law enforcement with specific and restricted 
responsibilities.168 Nonetheless, the true identity of most informants is 
cited by opponents as a reason to limit the doctrine to undercover 
officers.169  
4.  Entrusting the Suspect Class 
It can be illustrative here to return to the Callahan case to provide an 
important distinction between undercover officers and informants.170 In 
that case, Bartholomew, the confidential informant, contacted the 
defendant to engage in the sale of narcotics, completed the transaction, and 
finally signaled the officers into the defendant’s home.171 But importantly, 
Bartholomew was first charged with drug possession before he decided to 
become an informant and assist law enforcement.172 Furthermore, he was 
intoxicated at the time he acted as an official informant.173 This raises valid 
concerns about the capacity of informants to carry out functions normally 
entrusted to law enforcement officers.174 Just as in Callahan, confidential 
informants are typically criminals or have criminal charges pending against 
                                                                                                                     
cause, but this is obviously within the realm of the typical informant. See infra Part IV.B.4. In this 
limited activity there is no real perceptible difference between an informant and an officer.  
 165. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
 166. Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 767 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). 
 167. See supra note 148; see also Callahan, 494 F.3d at 897. 
 168. To be a government agent for Fourth Amendment purposes two questions must be 
considered: 1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and 2) 
whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his 
own ends. Callahan, 494 F.3d at 902 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 
797 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
 169. See United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 813 (6th Cir. 2005) (Gilman, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Jachimko, 905 F. Supp. 540, 542 (N.D. Ill. 1995).  
 170. See supra Part I. 
 171. Callahan, 494 F.3d at 893 (majority opinion). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 813 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
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them.175 The resulting issues that arise are obvious. The determination of 
probable cause is squarely in the hands of someone who has little 
experience in such an area and one who also has much less 
accountability.176 Moreover, because it is commonplace for informants to 
receive favorable prosecutorial treatment177 or large amounts of cash to 
cooperate with law enforcement,178 the informant’s own self-interest could 
result in entrapment of innocent individuals.179  
On the other hand, the most effective confidential informants are often 
those “most deeply implicated in the crimes being investigated.”180 In the 
world of drug trafficking, it is very difficult to obtain evidence without a 
decoy181 and the role of confidential informants is crucial in combating the 
illegal narcotics system.182 Considerations about entrapment are also 
reduced because of the innately close supervision necessary to meet the 
elements of the consent-once-removed doctrine. The doctrine requires 
officers to be presently located at the scene and prepared to make the 
arrest; the informant has relatively little decision-making ability.183 
Moreover, the most important questions pertaining to constitutionality of 
extending the doctrine lie with assessing the privacy interest of the 
defendant and the necessity of back-up officers to assist an informant with 
arrest.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the possibility of ruling on the consent-once-removed doctrine 
and its extension, the Supreme Court’s recent Callahan decision instead 
confined its holding to an assessment of qualified immunity.184 A 
                                                                                                                     
 175. MALACHI L. HARNEY &  JOHN C. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 10, 32 
(Thomas 1960). 
 176. See Jacqueline E. Ross, Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations: A Comparative 
Perspective, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1501, 1513 (2002) (noting that it is more difficult for police officers 
to monitor the actions of confidential informants and that the lessened accountability of informants 
can cause some agencies to move away from their use). 
 177.  Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 813 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
178.  See Dennis G. Fitzgerald, INFORMANTS AND UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS 21-22 (CRC 
Press ed.) (2007); Thomas A. Mauet, Informant Disclosure and Production: A Second Look at Paid 
Informants, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564 (1995) (citing the federal government’s tab for payment to 
confidential informants as $97 million in 1993); see also Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1991) (noting that the confidential informant had on one occasion previously received 
$10,000 for assisting law enforcement). 
 179. Mauet, supra note 178, at 564. 
 180. Ross, supra note 176, at 1513 (citing GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE 
SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 320 (Twentieth Century Fund 1988)). 
 181. Amanda J. Schreiber, Dealing with the Devil: An Examination of the FBI’s Troubled 
Relationship with its Confidential Informants, 34 COLUM. J.L. &  SOC. PROBS. 301, 301–02 (2001). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 184. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
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definitive judgment of the doctrine’s constitutionality will have to wait. 
Nevertheless, the doctrine’s relative universal approval as to undercover 
officers demonstrates the lack of any challenging constitutional issues and 
its acceptance will likely continue in this respect.185 However, the 
extension of the doctrine to confidential informants proffers legitimate 
debate. Presently, the courts in favor of an extension of the doctrine 
outnumber those opposed186 and it appears there is a general trend of assent 
to the doctrine’s extension.187  
Given the diminished privacy interest of the defendant and the relative 
similarity of an undercover officer and an informant in the consent-once-
removed situation, the extension should be regarded as constitutional by 
future courts. When rights forfeited by a narcotics seller are placed 
alongside the incremental invasion of assisting law enforcement, the 
reasonableness of allowing extension of the doctrine becomes clear. 
Furthermore, many of the same reasonableness factors that led to general 
approval in an undercover officer situation equally apply to confidential 
informants.188 Firstly, if the defendant’s privacy interest has already been 
vitiated, the incoming officers will affect no more than what was already 
affected. Secondly, requiring a warrant where the same intrusion would 
legally occur whether or not a magistrate issues the warrant serves no 
purpose.189 Therefore, the extension of the consent-once-removed doctrine 
to confidential informants provides law enforcement officers with an 
extremely efficient tool in combating illegal narcotics and its use should be 
readily accepted. 
                                                                                                                     
 185. See supra Part III.C. 
 186. See supra Part IV.A. 
 187. Contra Ben Sobczak, Note, The Sixth Circuit’s Doctrine of Consent Once Removed: 
Contraband, Informants and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 889 (2008). 
 188. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 189. United States v. White, 660 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 1981). 
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